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INTRODUCTION
Under present bankruptcy law, an individual debtor may escape
liability for a debt while making either no payment or less than full
payment toward its satisfaction., An individual debtor may elect to
proceed with either a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 13 debt
adjustment.2 Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharges an individual's un-
1. See Lander, An Analysis and Comparison of the Nondischargeability Provisions of
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 639, 639-40
(1983).
2. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988).
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secured debts in exchange for his surrender of all of his non-exempt
property. Chapter 13 requires the debtor to pay a portion of the
debt over time before it can be discharged.3
The Bankruptcy Code4 creates narrow exceptions under which an
individual debtor may not discharge certain debts.5 Among these
exceptions- is section 523(a)(6) which excepts from discharge any
debt for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another en-
tity."6 The success of a creditor's attempt to except his claim from
discharge under this rule turns on the nature of the underlying act.
Where the injury is caused by negligence, the debt has traditionally
been held dischargeable.7 Where, on the other hand, the injury is
caused by deliberate and intentional wrongdoing, the creditor's
claim has traditionally been held nondischargeable.8
In a recent en banc decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the dischargeability of a debt arising from a civil assault
which resulted in either an intentional assault and/or battery, or a
"negligent assault."9 In In re Hartley 10 the court found itself a house
divided, splitting five to five on the issue of dischargeability.tI The
court thereby affirmed the district court's decision which held non-
dischargeable a debt arising from an intentional act by the debtor
that caused unintended physical injury.12 The Eighth Circuit stand-
off is significant because it represents the lack of certainty and uni-
formity with which courts throughout the country are handling cases
3. Lander, see supra note 1, at 639-40. Under Chapter 13 debt adjustment, the
debtor proposes to the bankruptcy court a plan for repaying the unsecured creditors.
Id. Depending upon the amount of the debtor's disposable income, the repayment
"dividend" may range from zero to one hundred percent of the total debt owed. Id.
Upon confirmation of the plan by the court and subsequent completion of the plan
by the debtor, the remainder of the unpaid debts are then discharged. Id. at 640.
Hence the debtor's debt has been readjusted.
4. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988) sets forth ten types of debts which are not dis-
chargeable for an individual debtor proceeding in bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988). It should be noted that "wilful" is a variant
spelling of "willful."
7. 8A CJ.S. BANKRUPTCY, § 332 (1988).
8. See In re Hartley, 874 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1989).
9. A "negligent assault" (or battery) is one where, though a judgment is or may
be had for assault, the "real nature of the defendant's liability [is] negligence and not
an intentional assault" (or battery). Annotation, Claim or judgment based on assault and
battery as liability for wilful and malicious injury within § 17(2) of Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.
§ 35(2)) barring discharge of such liability, 63 A.L.R.2d 549, 563 (1959) [hereinafter
Annotation] (the sections discussed in the annotation are precursors of present sec-
tion 523(a)(6)).
10. In re Hartley, 874 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1989).
11. See id.
12. In re Hartley, 100 B.R. 477, 480 (W.D. Mo. 1988). Four decisions have been
rendered in the bankruptcy case of James Lee Hartley. See infra note 71.
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that fall under section 523(a)(6).13 Given the disparate treatment of
debts arising as a result of intentional tortious conduct, it is impera-
tive that Congress clarify the standards underlying application of this
exception to discharge.14
The Eighth Circuit has recently demonstrated some sensitivity to
the plight of victims of debtor intentional tortious conduct. In In re
Le Maire,t5 the court limited the broad discharge of section 1328 by
refusing to allow a Chapter 13 debtor to adjust a debt arising as a
result of his willful and malicious conduct. The court held, in es-
sence, that the debtor's attempt to avoid responsibility for payment
of the debt by filing Chapter 13 bankruptcy was strong evidence of
bad faith. 16
The court's willingness to force the debtor to assume responsibil-
ity for his willful and malicious conduct, even where a Chapter 13
debtor has traditionally been allowed to escape such responsiblity,
evidences a greater concern for the victims of a debtor's intentional
torts. t7 The court's holding, however, leaves three questions unan-
swered. First, has the court's holding in Le Maire written an excep-
tion for willful and malicious conduct into the discharge provisions
of section 1328? Second, what will the practical effect of such an
exception be given the high standard of willful and maliciousness
under section 523(a)(6)?18 Finally, is the en banc decision in Le
Maire merely constrained to its egregious facts?
I. ELECTING BETWEEN A CHAPTER 7 OR CHAPTER 13 PROCEEDING
As indicated above, an individual debtor may proceed in bank-
ruptcy under either a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 13 debt
adjustment.19 Under Chapter 7, the pre-filing non-exempt assets of
the debtor are liquidated and used to pay the debtor's pre-filing lia-
bilities. 20 Under Chapter 13, the debtor proposes a plan to repay his
creditors a percentage of his unsecured debts.21 Thus a Chapter 7
debtor sacrifices present non-exempt assets, while a Chapter 13
13. Compare In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (only proof of an
intentional act which leads to injury is required, rather than proof of intent to injure)
with In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1985) (willful and malicious injury
requires proof of intent to injure).
14. Congress did attempt to clarify its intent on how section 523(a)(6) should be
interpreted, yet a greater split of authority continues, indicating the need for further
action.
15. In re Le Maire, 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990).
16. Id. 1353.
17. See id.
18. See infra note 108.
19. See supra note 2.
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debtor sacrifices future disposable income.2 2 All dischargeable debts
are discharged following completion of the asset liquidation or re-
payment plan.23
An individual debtor who has "regular income" may elect to pro-
ceed under either chapter. Discharge of all debts is the goal of the
debtor.24 The rational debtor, therefore, will select the bankruptcy
option that will facilitate the broadest discharge available, while pre-
serving as many assets and as much income as possible. To select
the best option, the debtor must compare the Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 discharge provisions.25
Under Chapter 7, the bankruptcy court must allow an individual
debtor a discharge of all debts unless one or more of the specific
grounds for denial of discharge under section 727(a) is found to ex-
ist.26 These grounds relate to debtor misconduct and require full
disclosure of all property and prepetition transfers by the debtor.27
The court must confirm a Chapter 13 plan if the plan satisfies seven
prerequisites enumerated in section 1325.28 This determination
usually comes down to one issue: whether "the plan has been pro-
posed in good faith" by the debtor.29
Because most debtors have only a minimal amount of non-exempt
assets, the scope of the discharge provision is the foremost consider-
ation in determining under which chapter to proceed. A Chapter 7
discharge is for all debt, arising before the date of the order for re-
lief, except for those debts declared nondischargeable by section
523(a).30
A Chapter 13 discharge applies to all debts provided for by the
plan, except for two types of debts: 1) installment debts which ex-
tend beyond the term of the plan; and 2) alimony, maintenance, and
child support debts. 3l Thus, nine of the ten section 523(a) debts
22. An unsecured creditor may object to a plan unless the debtor pays to the
creditors all disposible income over a three year period. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(B)
(1988).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988).
24. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL §§ 1.01--.14 (1980 &
Supp. 1988).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988) is the operative discharge section of the Code for a
Chapter 7 proceeding, and 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988) defines the scope of the Chapter
13 discharge.
26. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1328.01[1][c], (15th ed. 1989) (hereinafter
COLLIER].
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). See also 4 COLLIER supra note 26, at
§ 727.01-.12. The denial provisions of section 727 apply only to Chapter 7 proceed-
ings. 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
28.- 11 U.S.C. § 1325; see infra note 171.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3); see also COLLIER, supra note 26, at 1328-5.
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988) provides that:
[Vol. 16
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may be discharged under Chapter 13.32
If a debtor has few or no non-exempt assets, a Chapter 7 proceed-
ing will best achieve the goal of discharging debts while preserving
assets and future income. This is the chapter under which the debtor
in Hartley proceeded. If the debtor is seeking to discharge a debt
which is not dischargeable under Chapter 7, a Chapter 13 proceed-
ing has traditionally been the best alternative. This is the chapter
under which the debtor in Le Maire chose to proceed.
II. HISTORY OF THE EXCEPTION FOR WILLFUL
AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT
The historical purpose of allowing discharge of debts in bank-
ruptcy is to allow the "honest but unfortunate debtor" a "fresh
start" in life, free from the oppressive liabilities incurred before
bankruptcy.3S The rationale is two-fold. First, post-petition wages
are fundamental to the debtor's ability to earn a livlihood. Second, if
all one's earnings are going to a creditor, there is less incentive to
work, with poverty the likely result.34 The section 523(a)(6) excep-
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments
under the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge exe-
cuted by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the court
shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or
disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
Section 1322(b)(5) excepts from discharge "any unsecured claim or secured claim on
which the last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the
plan is due .. " Section 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge debts owed "to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of
such spouse or child ....
32. The only section 523(a) debt nondischargeable under Chapter 13 is section
523(a)(5). See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (1988).
33. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Local Loan Co. is well
known in bankruptcy law for this passage:
This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts
as being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns
at the time of the bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexist-
ing debt.
Id. at 244 (emphasis added). "The two most important aspects of the fresh start
available under the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a
return to normal life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection
attempts." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5963, 6086 (hereinafter BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION). For a brief overview
of the historical rationale behind bankruptcy law see Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Dis-
charge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C.L. REV. 723, 724-25 (1980).
34. Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 245. The Court states that discharge in bank-
ruptcy is of "public as well as private interest." Id. at 244. It is clear to see how this
1990]
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tion from discharge for debts incurred as a result of willful and mali-
cious injury clearly does not come within the purview of this
rationale.35
An exception for "willful and malicious" injuries has been in effect
since 1898.36 In 1904 the United States Supreme Court in Tinker v.
Colwel37 interpreted this statutory phrase.38 The Court held that an
act which causes injury is willful if it is voluntary.39 Malice, the Court
found, in its legal sense means "a wrongful act, done intentionally,
without just cause or excuse."4 0 Malice does not require "a malig-
nant spirit or a specific intention to hurt" the creditor.41 Rather, ma-
licious intent is manifested by an injurious act committed in
disregard of the rights of another.42 Therefore, where one acted
with a "willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act
which is against good morals, and wrongful in and of itself, and
which necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally," the law
implied malice.43
policy benefits the public. If a debtor is not allowed to discharge debts, as a rationale
exercise of choice, that debtor may cease gainful employment and become a public
charge, to be supported by the taxpayers: "From the viewpoint of the wage earner
there is little difference between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.
Pauperism may be the necessary result of either." Id. at 245. Allowing discharge also
serves "as an incentive to further [the debtor's] honest effort to obtain a livelihood."
In re Levenstein, 180 F. 957, 958 (D. Conn. 1910).
It is also clear to see how the policy benefits the debtor. What is less clear is how
discharge benefits the private interest-the particular creditor involved. But see infra
notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
35. Were such a debt freely dischargeable there would be less incentive to avoid
intentional harm to another, and it would work a greater inequity by shifting to the
injured creditor the entire harm caused by the debtor.
36. The present 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) has been in effect since October 1, 1979,
the date upon which the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 superseded the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. Former II U.S.C. § 35(a)(8) contained a similar provision. Section
17(a)(2) of the 1898 Act excepted from discharge debts for "wilful and malicious
injuries to the person or property of another." Act of July 1, 1988, ch. 541,
§ 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1979).
37. 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
38. Tinker was a bankruptcy case under former section 17(a)(2) in which the un-
derlying judgment against the debtor was for criminal conversation. The creditor
husband had thereby suffered an injury to his property-his wife (with whom the
debtor had sexual intercourse). The question presented was whether such a tortious
act by the debtor was "willful and malicious" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at
480.
39. Id. at 486.
40. Id. at 485-86.
41. Id. at 487.
42. Id. at 486-87.
43. Id. at 487.
[Vol. 16
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A. Statutoy Law-Congressional Intent
The "reckless disregard" interpretation of "willful and malicious"
was a settled proposition, and for seventy-five years it was clear what
was meant by this phrase.44 But when Congress repealed the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 and replaced it with the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, it expressly overruled Tinker.45 A United States House of
Representatives Report stated " 'willful' means deliberate or inten-
tional;" to the extent that prior cases relied upon the looser "reck-
less disregard" standard of Tinker v. Colwell they are overruled.46
This congressional action has led to great confusion and a split of
authority among the United States circuit courts in how to apply sec-
tion 523(a)(6).4
7
B. Examination of Other Jurisdictions
Some courts have held that for a debt to be excepted from dis-
charge the debtor must have intended not only his act, but also the
harm which resulted from his act. 4 8 It has been held that the word
"willful" modifies "injury," thereby requiring not merely an inten-
tional act which causes injury but rather an "intentional or deliberate
injury."49 An act in reckless disregard of the rights of others does
not rise to the level of "willful and malicious" conduct.50 Congress
44. In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
45. BANKRUrcY LAW REVISION, supra note 33, at 363. S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 77-79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5787, 5863-65.
46. Id.
47. Note, In re Cecchini: Willful and Malicious Injury---Nondischargeability in Bank-
ruptcy, 17 PAc. L.J. 1511, 1520 (1986) (authored by Jeffrey H. Ochrach).
48. This strict interpretation is perhaps best exemplified by In re Hodges, 4
Bankr. 513, 516-17 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) ("reckless disregard" standard and/or
negligence is insufficient, "malicious" requires a subjective intent to do harm by
debtor and cannot be implied, both "willful" and "malicious" must be shown). But
see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (4th Cir. 1985)
(implied malice is sufficient, since to require proof of subjective malice "would re-
strict § 523(a)(6) to the small set of cases where the debtor was foolhardy enough to
make some plainly malevolent utterance expressing his intent to injure his creditor").
49. In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1985) (drunken driving debt
dischargeable under section 523(a)(6) because Congress rejected the Tinker "reckless
disregard" standard in favor of requiring finding of intentional injury). But see In re
Adams, 761 F.2d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (section 523(a)(6) should be construed
in light of Congress' July 1984 enactment of section 523(a) (9), so the act of driving
while intoxicated is sufficiently intentional to find willfulness and malice as contem-
plated by section 523(a)(6)).
50. In re Wrenn, 791 F.2d 1542, 1544 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (reckless disregard was
"insufficient to support a finding of 'willful and malicious' injury" in awarding attor-
neys fees). Accord In re Held, 734 F.2d 628, 629 (11 th Cir. 1984) (in awarding puni-
tive damages, the jury's possible basis on recklessness did not reach to the level of
willful and maliciousness). But see Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257,
19901
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expressly overruled the Tinker "reckless disregard" standard for dis-
chargeability.5l Section 523(a)(6) is to be narrowly construed, and
both willfulness and malice must be found.52
Other courts have held that for a debt to fall under the exception
to dischargeability, a finding of constructive malice is sufficient; a
subjective showing of the debtor's intent to do harm is not re-
quired.53 Thus it has been held that implied or constructive malice
satisfies section 523(a)(6),54 and that a specific intent to do harm is
not required.55 Rather it is sufficient to find a wrongful act done
intentionally, which necessarily results in harm and is without just
cause or excuse.56
C. Examination of the Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit, in deciding two prior cases under section
523(a)(6), has aligned itself with those courts which interpret the
statute strictly.57 In In re LongS8 the court held dischargeable a con-
version of borrowed funds because there was no proof the debtor
1263 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("malice for purposes of § 523(a)(6) can be established by a
finding of implied or constructive malice").
51. Supra note 45. See also In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied sub nom. Kelt v. Quezada, 467 U.S. 1217 (1984) (negligence in permitting pit
bull to cause injury did not constitute willful infliction of injury and therefore the
debt was dischargeable).
52. In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1985) (narrow construction of the
statute is required to effectuate the policy of permitting bankrupts a fresh start, and a
mere finding of an intentional conversion does not meet the requirement of finding
both willfulness and malice).
53. This looser interpretation of section 523(a)(6) is well-exemplified by United
Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766, 768-70 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983), which
surveys the history of the "willful and malicious injury" exception.
54. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1263 (11 th Cir. 1988), see
supra note 50; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009-10
(4th Cir. 1985) (implied malice was enough to make debtor's liability nondischarge-
able), see supra note 48.
55. Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 1986) ("maliciousness" is
still controlled by Tinker, and it means "in conscious disregard of one's duties or
without just cause or excuse; it does not require ill will or specific intent to do harm).
But see supra note 49, In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1985) (Congress'
intent was to render Tinker obsolete).
56. In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (this satisfies the "willful
and malicious" standard, even without proof of a specific intent to injure). But see
supra notes 48 and 49.
57. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. The Missouri Bankruptcy
Court, which heard Hartley de novo, noted in its opinion that "the Court [sic] is
highly cognizant of the extremely heavy burden that the Eighth Circuit has placed on
proponents of § 523(a)(6) claims." In re Hartley, 75 Bankr. 165, 166 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1987) aff'd 100 Bankr. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd, 869 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.), aff'd
on reh'g en banc, 874 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1989).
58. 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 16
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had committed the act with a malicious intent or the expectation of
harming the creditor's economic interests.59 The court found that to
bar discharge both willfulness and malice must be shown, that the for-
mer means intentional or deliberate, and that the latter requires
"conduct more culpable than that which is in reckless disregard of
the creditor's economic interests and expectancies." 60
In Cassidy v. Minihan6l the court held dischargeable under section
523(a)(6) ajudgment for injuries suffered in an automobile accident
caused by a drunken driver.62 The court found the prevailing view
allowed discharge "absent a showing that the debtor acted with in-
tent to inflict injury."63 The court concluded such a view was also
the intent of Congress. 64 As the debtor's conduct at worst amounted
to reckless disregard, the debt was dischargeable. 65
III. ELEMENTS OF THE LAW
In determining whether an injury comes within the scope of sec-
tion 523(a)(6) courts generally look behind the judgment to deter-
mine the nature of the action.66 Judgments for assault and battery
are presumed to be for "willful and malicious" injury unless the ac-
tual nature of the defendant's liability is negligence and not an inten-
tional assault or battery.67 In addition, the express language of the
59. Id. at 881-82. The court said that the debtor's knowledge that he was violat-
ing the creditor's legal rights is insufficient to establish malice; some additional "ag-
gravated circumstances" would need to be shown under the formulation of Davis v.
Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
60. Id. at 880-81. The court approved of the use of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 8A comment b (1965) as a requirement for the bar to discharge (as the
probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than sub-
stantial certainty, the actor's conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere
recklessness), saying the expected harm must be " 'certain or substantially certain' to
occur." Id. at 881. However, intent also may be measured in an objective sense. Id.
61. 794 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 344. This accident occurred before Congress in 1984 added to the list
of exceptions to discharge section 523(a)(9) relating to debts arising out of accidents
caused by drunk drivers.
63. Id. at 343. The court cited for support In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1158
(10th Cir. 1985), see supra note 49.
64. Id. at 343-44.
65. Id. at 344.
66. See 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 805 (1980). See also Greenfield v. Tuccillo,
129 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1942) (form of judgment itself does not control, and
resort to entire record may be had to determine dischargeability). But see Peters v.
United States, 177 F. 885, 888 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 217 U.S. 606 (1910).
67. See Annotation, supra note 9, at § 10. See In re Garland, 401 F. Supp. 608, 610
.(E.D. Pa. 1975) (there was no evidence indicating willfulness and maliciousness of
assault and battery); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Granskov, 246 Wis. 87, 91, 16 N.W.2d
437, 439 (1944) (bankrupt sheriff was merely negligent in failing to protect prisoner
1990]
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Code,68 and the public policy, purpose underlying it, are
considered.69
The elements to be considered under section 523(a)(6) are b'asi-
cally those which constitute an intentional tort: (1) an intentional act
by the debtor; (2) done with intent to harm or with reckless disregard
of others' rights or without just cause or excuse; (3) which causes an
injury to the creditor; and (4) which is the proximate result of the
debtor's act. 70 It is nearly always the second element which proves
to be the issue: did the debtor act with a malicious intent?
IV. IN RE HARTLEY
Hartley arose out of the circumstances surrounding an employer-
employee relationship. 7 1 Rickey Jones was working in the unventi-
lated basement of an auto parts and tire service co-owned by James
Hartley. 72 At the direction of Hartley, Jones was cleaning and paint-
ing tires with a gasoline mixture. The accumulation of fumes made
the job barely tolerable.73 Aware of all the circumstances, and as a
"joke" on Jones, Hartley intentionally threw a lighted firecracker
into the basement.74 Hartley intended only to "startle" Jones; in-
from ensuing bodily attack by another, as sheriff did not act willfully and maliciously
in failing to protect).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
69. See, e.g., In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1985) (the section 523(a)(6)
exception is "narrowly construed, however, in order to effectuate the Congressional
policy of permitting bankrupts a fresh start"). But see, e.g., In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d
1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1986) (application of a "looser standard" under section
523(a)(6) would "uphold the bankruptcy policy of discharging the debts of honest
debtors," not all debtors regardless of merit (emphasis added)).
70. T. SALERNO, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION AND PRACTICE: A PRACTrmIONER's GUIDE
2D ED. 577-78 (1986).
71. 869 F.2d at 394-95. Four decisions have been rendered in the bankruptcy
case of James Lee Hartley: In re Hartley, 75 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)
(bankruptcy court held debt nondischargeable, and debtor appealed). In re Hartley,
100 Bankr. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (district court held debt nondischargeable, and
debtor appealed). In re Hartley, 869 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1989) (three-judge panel
reversed district court, holding debt dischargeable, and creditor appealed). In re
Hartley, 874 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1989) (in rehearing en banc, the Eighth Circuit
divided five to five, thereby vacating the decision of the Eighth Circuit Appellate
Panel and reaffirming the judgment of the district court that debt was
nondischargeable).
72. In re Hartley, 869 F.2d at 394-95.
73. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 478. Another employee had been performing the
task before Jones, but this employee quit the task due to the fumes and the smell.
Jones volunteered to take his place. Due to the conditions Jones from time to time
emerged to "get some air."
74. Id. Hartley testified that such "jokes" were commonplace, and that he and
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stead the gasoline fumes ignited.75 In the ensuing conflagration
Jones suffered burns over 29% of his body, including permanent
scaring and disfigurement to his arms, neck, and face.76
Jones filed a personal injury suit against Hartley in a Missouri'cir-
cuit court.7 7 Before the action went to trial Hartley filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition for the sole purpose of eliminating the potential
tort liability to Jones.78 Jones contested the discharge, arguing that
the claim arose from a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor,"
and was therefore barred from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).79
After consideration by four courts the debt was held to be nondis-
chargeable.80 Both the district court decision, which was ultimately
affirmed (holding the debt to be nondischargeable), and the vacated
decision of the Eighth Circuit Court three-judge panel (holding the
debt to be dischargeable), will be analyzed below.81
A. District Court Decision: Debt Nondischargeable
The district court found the sole legal issue to be whether the in-
jury was malicious within the meaning of section 523(a)(6), since
Hartley admittedly threw the firecracker intentionally.82 Curiously,
none of the four courts stated whatJones' underlying personal injury
suit was based upon; if Hartley was not found liable of an intentional
75. In re Hartley, 75 Bankr. at 166. Hartley meant only to startle or scare Jones,
and Hartley characterized his act as "horseplay."
76. Id.
77. Id. Though Jones was injured while he was in the employ of Shade Tree
Auto Parts and Tire Service, his cause of action in tort was not barred by a workers'
compensation act. The Missouri Workers' Compensation Law exempts from its pro-
visions employers which have no more than four employees, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.090, subd. 1. (2) (Vernon Supp. 1990), and Shade Tree was exempt on this
basis (according to Jones' counsel).
78. In re Hartley, 75 Bankr. at 166. Hartley's only other debts were about
$16,000 in secured debts and under $15,000 in unsecured debts. Id. Hartley and his
wife had monthly take-home pay of roughly $2,000. Id. The bankruptcy court con-
cluded that the bankruptcy was filed "for no other purpose" than to eliminate the
liability from the looming tort judgment the creditor was pursuing. Id.
79. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 478.
80. See supra note 71.
81. In the Hartley case the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc rendered no opinion, as
the court was equally divided and thus reached no decision. In re Hartley, 874 F.2d
1254 (8th Cir. 1989). Therefore the district court's decision was affirmed. Id. (The
last decision on appeal, by the Eighth Circuit panel, was vacated upon the granting of
Jones' petition for rehearing en banc. Id. Therefore the Eighth Circuit was reviewing
the district court decision en banc.) The district court and panel opinions have been
selected here for analysis as being representative of each of the opposing five-judge
factions on the Eighth Circuit.
82. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 479. The Eighth Circuit had previously held that
the "willful" and "malicious" standards must both be met, as the statute presents
them in the conjunctive. In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 880-81 (8th Cir. 1985).
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tort this fact would prove dispositive under prior Eighth Circuit
rulings .83
The district court noted that the required "malicious" intentional
harm could be shown in either of two ways. 84 First, the creditor
could prove the debtor subjectively intended for the harmful conse-
quences to follow.85 Alternatively, the creditor would merely have to
prove that, given the debtor's act, the resulting injury to the creditor
would be substantially ("largely, but not wholly") certain to result.86
The district court borrowed this standard of intent to harm from
Prosser's minimum standard of intent to find liability for an inten-
tional tort. Prosser states that "where a reasonable man in the defend-
ant's position would believe that a particular result was substantially
certain to follow, he will be dealt with as though he had intended
it."87
The district court applied the Prosser "reasonable man" standard
to the facts of Hartley to determine the outcome of the sole legal is-
sue in the case. 88 The court reasoned that throwing a lighted fire-
cracker into a room known to be filled with gasoline fumes "is
substantially certain to cause an explosion and that a reasonable man
would recognize that fact."89 Therefore, it concluded, the debtor
maliciously intended the harm which resulted to the creditor, and the
debt is nondischargeable. As the court succinctly stated: "[t]here are
83. As the Hartley district court noted, the Eighth Circuit had previously held that
only debts arising from intentional injuries were nondischargeable. Injuries arising
from mere wanton or reckless conduct are dischargeable. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at
479 (citing Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1986)). See also In re Long,
774 F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1985) (Section 523(a)(6) malice applies "only to conduct
more culpable than that which is in reckless disregard .... ). These two cases consti-
tute the two section 523(a)(6) cases decided by the Eighth Circuit before Hartley.
84. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 479.
85. Id. Because this determination of another's subjective state of mind would
put upon the courts a nearly impossible expectation, a second method of determin-
ing malicious intent was proffered. Id. See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (4th Cir. 1985); supra note 48.
86. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 479. The district court's definition of "substan-
tially certain" was taken from WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1153 (1979):
"largely, but not wholly" certain. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 479-80.
87. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 479 (emphasis added by the court), citing W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 32 (4th ed. 1971).
Only the district court utilized the Prosser "reasonable man" standard. The
Eighth Circuit three-judge panel did not use this looser standard of intentional harm.
In a prior Eighth Circuit case, the court suggested that section 523(a)(6) mali-
cious intentional harm could be determined based upon the standard expressed in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A comment b: the expected harm must be "cer-
tain, or substantially certain" to occur. In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir. 1985).
The Hartley district court then loosened one step further the required standard for
finding a malicious intent to injure-the Prosser "reasonable man" standard.
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circumstances under which the law will not excuse a 'white heart and
empty head'; this is one of those times."90
B. Eighth Circuit Three-Judge Panel Decision: Debt Dischargeable
The Eighth Circuit three-judge panel found the legal issue to be
whether the injury suffered by the creditor was intentionally inflicted by
the debtor.9t In summarizing the arguments of both debtor and
creditor, the court made clear that whether the debtor's act was in-
tentional was not the dispositive issue.9 2 The debtor argued the debt
was dischargeable because he did not intend to injure the creditor
when he intentionally threw the firecracker.9 3 The creditor argued
the debt was nondischargeable claiming that, upon the intentional
throwing of the firecracker at the creditor, the debtor became re-
sponsible for all the foreseeable consequences resulting from the
willful act.94
The court declared that while creditor "Jones' argument is a
proper analysis for tort liability .... the tort standard of liability is
not the same as the standard used to determine whether a debi is
nondischargeable under section 523(a)(6)." 9 5 Thus it is clear that
even a bona fide intentionally tortious act, which results in physical
injvry, does not in and of itself rise to the level of a "willful and
malicious injury."96 The previous two section 523(a)(6) cases de-
cided by the Eighth Circuit97 were found to support the rule that, to
preclude discharge, the debtor must have acted intending to harm
90. Id. This pithy aphorism is highly revealing of the court's unstated standard
for "malicious injury." A "white heart" connotes an utter lack of malicious intent; an
"empty head" connotes not an intentional lack of due care but rather negligence.
Thus, despite the language the court used, it must be concluded that Hartley's debt
was held nondischargeable not on the basis of malicious intent to injure but on the
basis of reckless disregard. See supra note 83 for proof of the district court's own
inconsistency and failure to follow Eighth Circuit precedent.
91. In re Hartley, 869 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1989). "As the statute was written
by Congress, it is the injury to the creditor which must have been intentional-not
the action of the debtor which caused the accident." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Thus the creditor was claiming a strict intentional tort standard for
dischargeability.
95.. Id. The court cited as support for this interpretation the Report of the House
Judiciary Committee, which overruled the Tinker standard of "reckless disregard" as
being sufficient for a finding of "willful and malicious injury" under section
523(a)(6). See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
96. What the court is doing here goes well beyond looking behind the judgment
to ensure that the actual nature of the debtor's liability is not mere negligence, see
supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Rather the court is saying that a mere
intentional tort judgment, standing alone, is not enough to find nondischargeability.
In order to bar discharge "aggravated circumstances" must also be present.
97. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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the "interests" of the creditor.98 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit
three-judge panel held that, "[i]n the instant case there is simply no
proof that Hartley threw the firecracker into the basement intending
to cause the explosion and fire that injured Jones." 99 Therefore the
court held the debt dischargeable. 100
The creditor then appealed the ruling. On a rehearing en banc the
Eighth Circuit deadlocked five to five on the issue, thereby reaffirm-
ing the district court's decision of nondischargeability.tO1
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS' DECISIONS
Both the district court and Eighth Circuit panel decisions took lib-
erties interpreting prior Eighth Circuit case law to find support for
their respective holdings under section 523(a)(6). The divergent
holdings, though citing the same two precedents, can partially be ex-
plained in that Hartley was a case of first impression within the circuit.
It presented both a possible intentional tort (assault and/or battery)
by the debtor and resultant physical harm to the creditor.102 Such a
combination of factors clearly may color the application of a stan-
dard which has been interpreted as variably as section 523(a)(6).103
Despite the language used, the district court effectively employs
something akin to a "reckless disregard" standard of dis-
chargeability.104 Recognizing that subjective intent to harm would
98. See In re Hartley, 869 F.2d at 395. This standard is extreme, and clearly goes
beyond the standard which the Eighth Circuit precedents required for a finding of
"willful and malicious injury." In In re Long, 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985), the
Eighth Circuit approved of using a tort definition of intent to determine if the debt
was dischargeable, and also found proof of intent permissible in an objective sense.
99. In re Hartley, 869 F.2d at 395.
100. Id.
101. In re Hartley, 874 F.2d at 1254 (8th Cir. 1989).
102. See 869 F.2d at 396 (in dissent Judge Bowman argues that Hartley's deliber-
ate act "clearly amounted to an assault upon Jones").
Neither of the prior Eighth Circuit cases concerned a fact situation which reason-
ably could have supported a judgment for an intentional tort and in which the tortious
act caused serious physical injuries to the creditor. In In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 882
(8th Cir. 1985), it was held that a debtor's willful breaking of a security agreement
with a corporate creditor did not constitute a nondischargeable malicious conversion.
In Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 1986), it was held that a judgment
for injuries suffered by the creditor from an automobile accident caused by the
debtor drunk driver was dischargeable under section 523(a)(6). The accident pre-
ceded the 1984 passage by Congress of section 523(a)(9), which precludes discharge
of debts arising "as a result of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally
intoxicated," so the creditor pursued his claim under section 523(a)(6). Thus in Long
the court faced an intentional tort (conversion) but no physical injuries, while in Cas-
sidy the court faced negligence but with physical injuries to the creditor.
103. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text on how the confusion sur-
rounding section 523(a)(6) has led to a split of authority among the courts.
104. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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be nearly impossible to prove, ' 0 5 the court permits, in the alterna-
tive, proof of the "likelihood of harm in an objective sense."' 106 The
district court thereby arrives at the old standard of "constructive
malice," which was expressly overruled by Congress in its comment
on Tinker.10 7 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit three-judge
panel concluded that it must be proven that the debtor (subjectively)
intended to injure the creditor;108 proof of liability for a bona fide
intentional tort is not by itself enough to make a debt
nondischargeable. 109
Congressional intent makes both of these interpretations appear
wide of the mark. Before 1978 it was a well-settled proposition that
the Tinker reckless disregard/constructive malice standard was the
operative definition of "willful and malicious."' "10 There can be no
doubt that Congress, in adopting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, intended to replace the Tinker "reckless disregard" standard
with a heavier burden for the creditor to carry."I' It appears that
Congress, as a requirement for nondischargeability, has mandated a
finding of something beyond proof of an intentional tort." 1
2
The two prior Eighth Circuit decisions interpreting section
523(a)(6)'13 indicate that where the court is faced with a fact situa-
tion in which mere ordinary negligence causes serious physical inju-
ries, the debt will be found dischargeable. But where, as in Hartley,
serious physical injuries are caused by recklessness' '4-by positive
acts of commission rather than omission--or by attempted intention-
ally tortious acts, the court is divided. The court is torn between a
rule which on its face mandates discharge in such situations, and a
desire to financially compensate creditors who are physically injured
by culpable, morally blameworthy debtors. Without resolution by
105. See supra note 48. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003,
1009-10 (4th Cir. 1985).
106. In re Hartley, 100 Bankr. at 479.
107. The Tinker standard for malice did not require a specific intent to harm. See
supra text accompanying note 41. Instead, malice could be implied based upon the
conduct of the debtor. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text for accord with this position.
109. In re Hartley, 869 F.2d at 395.
110. See supra note 95.
111. See supra note 53.
112. See supra note 53. Based on the plain meaning of the words, courts which
held no change occurred in the interpretation of the section 523(a)(6) "willful and
malicious injury" language before and after 1978 simply disregarded Congress' ex-
press intent to alter the status quo in some way.
113. See supra note 102.
114. "Recklessness is a stronger term than mere or ordinary negligence, and to be
reckless, the conduct must be such to evince disregard of or indifference to conse-
quences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety of others, although
no harm was intended." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1142-43 (5th ed. 1979).
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Congress the court will either have to apply the letter of the law-
with- its attendant harsh and unjust result for the creditor-or else
reinterpret Congress' intent and make the debtor bear the burden of
his act. If Hartley did commit an intentional tort, what does section
523(a)(6) require for a finding of nondischargeability? Following the
express overruling of Tinker by Congress, i"5 it seems apparent that
the intent and language of section 523(a)(6) now require something
beyond merely that the tort be intentional. 116 While this reading may
lead to harsh results in Hartley-type situations, it does appear to be
what Congress intended. 1 17
The overarching policy of bankruptcy law is to provide to the
"honest but unfortunate" debtor a fresh start."t8 The ten types of
debts listed in section 523(a) represent a policy judgment that these
types of debts are not deserving of discharge under a Chapter 7 liq-
uidation proceeding. To better achieve these policy goals, the fol-
lowing amendment of section 523(a)(6) is suggested. The Code
ought to distinguish between debts arising from contract-based and
tort-based claims. Where a breach of contract or property-type of-
fense is at issue, the present willful and malicious injury standard
ought apply.'19 Unless the debtor intends malicious injury to the
creditor, discharge will best achieve the policy goal of allowing con-
sumer debtors a fresh start. 120 Where the creditor is an involuntary
creditor, and has been physically injured by an intentional tort com-
mitted by the debtor, the public policy of denying Chapter 7 dis-
charge via the section 523(a)(6) exception can best be achieved by
adopting a straight tort standard for determining dischargeability.121
115. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. But see In re Hartley, 869 F.2d
394, 396 n.I (8th Cir. 1989) (Bowman, J. dissenting):
It seems to me that a claim for injury resulting from an assault, which is what
we have here, should always be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). More
broadly, I doubt that Congress intended that claims for injuries resulting
from intentional torts should be dischargeable. Certainly, we should not
lightly infer that Congress has created a safe haven in the Bankruptcy Code
for intentional tortfeasors.
117. In addition to Congress' clear negation of the prior Tinker reckless disregard
standard, Congress has not seen fit to remedy this situation in the 11 years since the
Code has been in effect.
118. Rendleman, see supra note 33, at 723; Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234
(1934).
119. The reference here is to the more stringent standard, which requires a sub-
jective intent by the debtor to harm the creditor.
120. See Rendleman, supra note 33, at 724-25. It is clear that modern bankruptcy
laws are aimed at relieving consumer debtors, those who are debtors by virtue of un-
payable contractual obligations acquired through extensions of credit. Id.
121. The Eighth Circuit three-judge panel stated that a tort standard of liability
was not the proper standard for determining whether an act is willful and malicious so
as to bar discharge under section 523(a)(6).
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Non-contract based intentionally tortious acts would be nondis-
chargeable while debts arising out of negligent acts would remain
dischargeable.
VI. CHAPTER 13 DEBT ADJUSTMENT
Even if the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had found Hartley's
debt to be nondischargeable under Chapter 7 pursuant to section
523(a) (6), Hartley still may not have had to make full payment on the
debt. Provided a debtor like Hartley met maximum debt allowances,
he simply could have converted his Chapter 7 liquidation into a
Chapter 13 debt adjustment plan.122 His obligation would have
been to pay all of his disposable income to his creditors for, at most,
a period of five years.' 23 Upon successful completion of the plan he
then could have had his remaining debts automatically discharged,
notwithstanding the bar of section 523(a)(6) for Chapter 7
bankruptcies. 124
A. Statutory Law-Operation of Chapter 13
With passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,125 Congress
created an alternative to the normal bankruptcy procedure of liqui-
dation of the debtor's non-exempt assets.' 2 6 Under this alternative,
instead of liquidating assets, the debtor dedicates as much future dis-
posable income as possible for a specified period of time to creditor
repayment. 127 If the debtor has successfully completed the plan as
proposed by the debtor and confirmed by the court,' 28 then all debts
provided for under the plan will be discharged, with only two excep-
tions.129 The Chapter 13 alternative thus allows the debtor to both
retain non-exempt assets and discharge remaining debts.13O
The purpose of allowing the debtor to choose Chapter 13 "debt
adjustment" as an alternative to the normal Chapter 7 liquidation
procedure is to give debtors an incentive to repay their debts. 13 In
enacting this alternative, Congress believed both debtor and creditor
122. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(c) and 706 (1988).
123. Five years is the maximum statutory period of time for which the court may
approve a Chapter 13 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988).
125. See supra note 5.
126. Hughes, Chapter 13's Potential for Abuse, 58 N.C.L. REV. 831, 831 (1980).
127. Id. at 831-32.
128. See infra note 171 and accompanying text on the requirements for confirma-
tion of a Chapter 13 plan.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988). The only two debts which are excepted from
discharge under Chapter 13 are certain long-term debts and alimony, child support
or maintenance. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(5) and 523(a)(5).
130. See BANKRUPTCY LAw REVISION, supra note 33, at 118.
131. See Hughes, supra note 126, at 831.
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would be better off under a debt repayment plan.i3 2 The debtor is
allowed to retain non-exempt assets, to better protect his credit rat-
ing, avoid the stigma attached to an ordinary liquidation bankruptcy
proceeding, and to retain pride in being able to meet obligations. 133
The benefit to creditors is that they fare no worse under a Chapter
13 repayment plan, creditors fare no worse than under liquida-
tion,'34 and likely they will fare significantly better.' 3 5 Thus Con-
gress created incentives for a debtor to elect Chapter 13.
One of the incentives was a more liberal discharge provision.13 6
While ten types of debt are nondischargeable under Chapter 7, only
two types of debt are nondischargeable under Chapter 13.1 3 7
Shortly after the Code became effective one commentator concluded
that this disparity was an oversight by Congress rather than a delib-
erate policy decision, and that this disparity created a great potential
for debtors to abuse the purpose of Chapter 13.138 While the more
liberal discharge provision may be subject to abuse in some situa-
tions, the countervailing considerations also have merit.ta9
The liberality of the Chapter 13 discharge provisi6h might best be
viewed as a concession to reality: the less incentive the Code gives
the debtor to repay the creditor, the more likely the debtor will be to
cease gainful employment or flee the jurisdiction.14 0 Such a result
132. See BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, supra note 33, at 118.
133. Id.
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988). In order to have the court confirm a
Chapter 13 debt adjustment plan, this subsection requires that the unsecured credi-
tors receive at least as much under the lan as they would have received under a
Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. Id.
135. See BANKRUPTCY LAw REVISION, supra note 33, at 118.
136. Congress indicated a preference for Chapter 13 for those who do utilize the
bankruptcy laws: "The premises of the bill [the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 with
respect to consumer bankruptcy are that use of the bankruptcy law should be a last
resort; that if it is used, debtors should attempt repayment under Chapter 13 .
Id.
137. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988) with 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988). See supra
note 129 for the two types of debts which can never be discharged in bankruptcy.
138. See Hughes, supra note 126, at 831, 843. Bankruptcy Judge Hughes (Bankr.
N.D. Cal.) reached this conclusion based uIpon the legislative history of sections 523
and 1328(a). Id. The abuse which Judge Hughes feared was that a debtor with a
section 523(a) debt nondischargeable under a Chapter 7 liquidation would skirt this
bar to discharge by proceeding under Chapter 13 with a plan that would pay all credi-
tors no more than they would have received under the Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. at
833-34. Under Chapter 13 the remaining unpaid portion of the section 523(a) debt
would be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(a) (1988). Where this does occur it would
seem to be an abuse of the spirit of the Code.
139. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
140. Recall that one of the rationales underlying the entire concept of bankruptcy
is that the public is benefitted by rehabilitating a debtor to be a productive economic
member of society. See supra note 34. To a large extent this rationale applies equally
to the creditor. If the debtor has no incentive to work he probably will not, and the
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leaves the creditor with only a Pyrrhic victory. One reading would be
that Congress intended the Chapter 13 discharge as a carrot to lead
the debtor to act-for the mutual benefit of debtor and creditor-by
fulfilling his obligations to the extent he is able.l41 Whether a given
Chapter 13 plan abuses the purpose of the Code ultimately turns on
how the Code is applied in that specific case.14 2
B. Examination of Jurisdictional Abuse Prohibitions
The sole barrier to abuse of the broad Chapter 13 discharge is the
Code's "good faith" requirement.143 As one court has stated it, "the
good faith requirement . . . is the only safety valve through which
plans attempting to twist the law to malevolent ends may be cast
out.' 14 4 The good faith requirement has become the focal point of
creditor challenges to confirmation of Chapter 13 plans. Good faith,
however, is not defined in the Code.145
To determine whether a Chapter 13 plan has been proposed in
good faith, most courts have developed a "totality of the circum-
stances" test. 146 In In re Rimgale,147 one of the earlier appellate deci-
sions to rule on the good faith requirement, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that it was the duty of the court to evaluate
good faith, and that good faith would have to be determined on a
case-by-case basis.148 This "scrutiny" of the plan was to be per-
formed by the bankruptcy judge; who was to consider a number of
factors which could bear on good faith.149
creditor may then receive at best the liquidation value of the debtor's non-exempt
assets, which value may well be a trifle.
141. See 5 COLLIER, see supra note 26, at § 1328.01[c] at 1328-5. See BANKRUPTCY
.Lw REVISION, supra note 33, at 118:
Chapter 13 ... protects a debtor's credit standing far better than a straight
bankruptcy, because he is viewed by the credit industry as a better risk. In
addition, it satisfies many debtors' desire to avoid the stigma attached to
straight bankruptcy and to retain the pride attendant on being able to meet
one's obligations. The benefit to creditors is self-evident: their losses will be signifi-
cantly less than if their debtors opt for straight bankruptcy.
Id. (emphasis added).
142. This in turn often comes down to the question of whether the Chapter 13
plan "has been proposed in good faith by the debtor." See infra note 174.
143. See infra note 171 for the seven requirements which the debtor must meet to
have the court confirm his plan. The good faith requirement is the only non-quantifi-
able, subjective requirement of the seven, and thus is the only requirement which the
courts can use to exercise discretion.
144. In re Leal, 7 Bankr. 245, 248 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
145. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
146. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 26, at § 1325.04[4] at 1325-18 n.45.
147. 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982).
148. Id. at 431.
149. Id. The court cited with approval In re Kull, 12 Bankr. 654, 659 (Bankr. S.D.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Goeb 150 stated that
good faith must be determined "in the light of all militating fac-
tors." 5 1 Influenced by a U.S. Supreme Court case stating that a
"bankruptcy court is a court of equity and is guided by equitable
doctrines and principles ... ,"152 the Ninth Circuit court held that the
good faith inquiry depends upon whether the plan contained misrep-
resentations of fact, the debtor sought to unfairly manipulate the
Code, or the plan was proposed in an inequitable manner. 153
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Deans v. O'Donnell154 bor-
rowed from each of these cases. There the court held that good faith
must be determined by reference to "all militating factors," that "the
totality of the circumstance must be examined on a case by case ba-
sis," and that a specific list of factors should be considered.155 Later
courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have followed the lead of these
earlier courts in finding a standard for the statutory good faith
requirement. 156
VII. EXAMINATION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT STANDARD
The Eighth Circuit has decided two prior cases involving section
1325.157 In In re Estus 158 the court reversed and remanded the dis-
trict court's holding that a Chapter 13 plan which proposed to pay
nothing and discharged a student loan met the statutory require-
ments for confirmation of the plan.159 The court began by stating
Congress' purpose in enacting Chapter 13 in 1978: to remedy the
previously inadequate system of providing relief to bankrupt con-
sumers, and to encourage more debtors to pay back their debts.160
Ga. 1981), which listed twelve factors to be considered in the good faith
determination.
150. 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. Id. at 1390 (emphasis in original).
152. American United Mutual Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 145
(1940) (citations omitted).
153. In re Goeb, 675 F.2d at 1390.
154. 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982).
155. Id. at 972.
156. In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982) is also often cited by other courts for
its adoption of a twelve-factor good faith test.
157. See infra notes 158 and 166.
158. 695 F.2d 311"(8th Cir. 1982).
159. Id. at 317.
160. Id. at 313. The court said:
Congress perceived that a major problem under the old bankruptcy law was
the inadequacy of relief provided for consumer debtors. New Chapter 13
was enacted to provide an effective system for dealing with consumer bank-
ruptcies and also to encourage more debtors to attempt to pay their debts
under bankruptcy court supervision.
Id. (citation omitted).
The court added that Congress liberalized the Chapter 13 provisions by: ex-
[Vol. 16
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The opinion then moved to the heart of the issue in Chapter 13 con-
firmation-good faith.
The court found that "[t]he good faith requirement demands a
separate, independent determination .. .whether the plan consti-
tutes an abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter 13."161
Twelve factors were set out to be considered and weighed in analyz-
ing the debtor's good faith.162 In Estus the court applied several of
the more salient factors in holding that the debtor's plan was not
proposed in good faith.163
It was noted that the duration of the plan, at fifteen months, was
shorter than the normal thirty-six month duration, that the debt
sought to be discharged would be nondischargeable under a Chapter
7 proceeding, and that the plan ignored the debtor's likely increase
in future income.164 Estus established a flexible, relatively objective
approach to the determination of good faith.
panding the class of individuals eligible to use Chapter 13; eliminating the old re-
quirement of approval of the debtor's plan by a majority of unsecured creditors;
expanding the scope of dischargeable debts by allowing discharge of all debts except
alimony and child support, and certain long term debts; and by allowing the debtor
to retain for himself some non-exempt assets, unlike a Chapter 7 proceeding. Id. at
313-14.
161. Id. at 316. The court first noted that Congress has not defined the term
"good faith" as it is used in section 1325(a)(1). Id. at 314.
162. Id. at 317. The twelve factors, as follows, were not considered to be an ex-
haustive list:
[I]n addition to the percentage of repayment to unsecured creditors [which
constitutes the twelfth factor], some of the factors that a court may find
meaningful in making its determination of good faith are:
(1) the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the debtor's
surplus;
(2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and likelihood of fu-
ture increases in income;
(3) the probable or expected duration of the plan;
(4) the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and per-
centage repayment of unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are
an attempt to mislead the court;
(5) the extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors;
(6) the extent to which secured claims are modified;
(7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is
nondischargeable in Chapter 7;
(8) the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical
expenses;
(9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act;
(10) the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief;
and




164. Id. The debt which would have been nondischargeable under Chapter 7 per
section 523(a)(8) was an educational loan from the Veterans Administration. Id. at
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In 1984 Congress amended section 1325 to require that, if an un-
secured creditor objected to confirmation of the debtor's plan, the
court could not approve the plan unless all of the debtor's projected
disposable income for three years would be applied to make pay-
ments under the plan.165 In Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner 166 the
Eighth Circuit ruled that this "ability to pay" criterion "subsumes
most of the Estus factors," with the result that the good faith test now
turns mainly on whether the debtor's plan was arrived at accurately
and without fraud, misrepresentation, or unfair manipulation of the
Bankruptcy Code.167 In this case, the court held the debtor's plan to
be proposed in good faith, finding that the debtor's income and ex-
penses were accurate and that the plan was a serious attempt to re-
pay the debt and not "an abuse of the bankruptcy laws."168 If all
disposable income for three years is committed to the plan, and the
plan is calculated accurately, the Eighth Circuit will find the requisite
good faith to confirm the plan.
An individual, proceeding in bankruptcy under Chapter 7, cannot
discharge a debt arising from a willful and malicious injury.169
Under Chapter 13 such a debt is dischargeable.170 The court must
confirm the debtor's proposed Chapter 13 plan if it satisfies seven
prerequisites enumerated in section 1325.17, These provisions are
312. Debtor Estus was a federal employee, and thus a future income increase was
apparently almost certain to occur within the length of the plan. Id. at 317.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l)(B) (1988).
166. 827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
167. Id. at 1227. The court stated that following the congressional amendment,
the good faith inquiry, i.e.,
[W]hether the plan "constitutes an abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit
of Chapter 13," Estus, 695 F.2d at 316, [now] has a more narrow focus. The
bankruptcy court must look at factors such as whether the debtor has stated
his debts and expenses accurately; whether he has made any fraudulent mis-
representation to mislead the bankruptcy court; or whether he has unfairly
manipulated the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. The nebulous phrase "unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy Code" is not defined
in the opinion.
168. Id.
169. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 523(a)(6) (1988).
170. 5 COLLIER, supra note 26, at § 1328.01[1][c]. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)
(1988). Under Chapter 13, Adjustment of Debts of an Individual With Regular In-
come, only two types of debts cannot be discharged. Id. The first exception to the
complete discharge policy is for long-term debts-those "on which the last payment
is due after the date on which the final payment under the [Chapter 13 payment] plan
is due." Id. at § 1322(b)(5). The second exception is for-any debt for alimony, main-
tenance, or support for a spouse or child. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
171. W. DRAxE, JR., BANKRuprcY PRAc-ricE § 13.15, at 13-43 (1989). If a creditor
objects to confirmation of the plan, the debtor must meet another requirement to
have the plan confirmed, which is included as the seventh requirement for confirma-
tion. Drake discusses these requirements at 13-50. The seven requirements are:
§ 1325. Confirmation of plan
[Vol. 16
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distinct, have clear standards, are easily applied, and are not fre-
quently at issue.172 Most challenges to discharge and confirmation
under a Chapter 13 plan occur when a debt is proposed for dis-
charge which would not be dischargeable under Chapter 7.173 Here
the salient issue becomes whether "the plan has been proposed in
good faith" by the debtor.174
Courts have struggled with the "good faith" requirement of Chap-
ter 13.175 Congress has never defined the term, 176 and before 1978
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the
other applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28,
or by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be dis-
tributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim
is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on
such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien
securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on ac-
count of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such
claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such
holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan.
(b)(l) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to
the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan
unless, as of the effective date of the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the amount of such claim;
or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable
income to be received in the three-year period beginning on
the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be
applied to make payments under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988).
172. Requirements (2), (4), and (6) of section 1328 and the seventh requirement,
section 1325(b)(1), primarily require only mathematical calculations to ascertain
whether they have been complied with. Requirement (1) merely requires that the
plan be in compliance with the general provisions of the Code. See W. DRAKE, JR.,
supra note 171, at § 13.15 at 13-43. Requirement (5) pertains only to secured claims,
and so is not at issue when the debtor is a tortfeasor. This leaves requirement (6) to
be piimarily at issue.
173. 5 COLLIER, see supra note 26, at § 1328.01[1][c] at 1328-4, 1328-5.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). See COLLIER, supra note 26, at 1328-5.
175. In re Le Maire, 883 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (8th Cir. 1989).
176. In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1982).
1990]
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there was no case law interpreting the term as used in Chapter 13.177
With the passage of Chapter 13 in 1978, the courts divided on
whether good faith required that there be a minimum debt repay-
ment for the plan to be confirmed. 178 Some courts held that good
faith required substantial or meaningful payments to unsecured
creditors, 17 9 while other courts held that no minimum level of pay-
ment was required.180 In 1984 Congress made clear that no mini-
mum level of payment was required.181 The appellate courts today
are largely in agreement that Chapter 13 good faith now pertains to
whether the debtor has accurately stated debts and expenses,
whether any fraudulent misrepresentation has been made, or
whether the Code is being unfairly manipulated by the debtor.'8 2
VIII. IN RE LE MAIRE
While the facts of the Hartley case suggest the debtor's act may
have only risen to the level of a "negligent assault,"183 in In re Le
Maire 184 the debtor's act could only be characterized as a vicious as-
sault. The opinion's recitation of the facts is riveting:
On July 9, 1978, at about noon, Handeen went to pick up his son
and found Le Maire waiting for him. When Handeen got out of his
car, Le Maire shot at him nine times with a bolt action rifle. The
first two shots missed Handeen, but the third struck him on the left
177. "Section 1325(a)(3) is derived from Section 651 of the former Bankruptcy
Act. There was no reported case law construing the good faith requirement under
Section 651 of the Bankruptcy Act nor did the original legislative history of Section
1325(a)(3) specifically reveal its rationale." 5 COLLIER, supra note 26, at § 1325.04 at
1325-10.
178. See infra notes 179-180.
179. See, e.g., In re Burrell, 2 Bankr. 650, 652-53 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980) (it is
necessary to read such a substantial payment requirement into 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)
on the basis that failure to do so will frustrate the objectives of Congress and lead to
absurd results), rev'd, 6 Bankr. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980); In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr.
256, 268 (Bankr. C.D. Utah 1980).
180. See, e.g., Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("section
1325(a)(3) does not require any particular level of minimum repayment"); In reJohn-
son, 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) ("courts should not read into the Act any per
se limitations or requirements in respect to 'good faith' that Congress did not
enact").
181. See The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), adding to 11 U.S.C. § 1325 the present section (b).
See supra note 171. This "ability to pay" provision has effectively eliminated the level
of debtor payments as a consideration under the good faith requirement. 5 COLLIER,
supra note 26, at § 1325.04[3] at 1325-17.
182. 5 COLLIER, supra note 26, § 1325.04[2] at 1325-17. The good faith test is also
often phrased as "whether or not under the circumstances of the case there has been
abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of [Chapter 13] in the proposal .... In re
Terry, 630 F.2d 634, 635 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980).
183. See supra note 9 for an explanation of the term "negligent assault."
184. 898 F.2d 1346.
[Vol. 16
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss3/9
BANKRUPTCY
side of his neck. Handeen then attempted to hide behind the car.
Le Maire circled the car, shot at and missed Handeen twice more,
and then hit him inside of his left knee. Le Maire circled again and
Handeen jerked his head back to avoid the bullet at the time he
thought Le Maire would pull the trigger of the rifle aimed at his
head. Le Maire fired, and the bullet went through Handeen's right
nostril, shattering the roof of his mouth and going through his
tongue. Le Maire then fired a shot at Handeen's left arm. The
bullet went through Handeen's arm and lodged on his spine. Le
Maire fired a final shot through Handeen's ankle. In all, five of the
nine shots fired by Le Maire struck Handeen. Le Maire declared
that he had intended to kill Handeen.' 8 5
Le Maire pled guilty to an aggravated assault charge. He received
a prison term of one to ten years and actually served twenty-seven
months of the term. 186 Le Maire was released from prison in
1981.187 He returned to graduate school at the University of Minne-
sota and in 1986 received a Ph.D. degree.188 Handeen then obtained
a civil judgment against Le Maire for $50,362.50, and attempted to
collect via garnishment of Le Maire's wages.'
8 9
Le Maire responded by filing a Chapter 13 proceeding. 190
185. Id. at 1347. A newspaper article reporting on Le Maire's criminal case ex-
panded on the facts of the attack:
Gregory Le Maire, 25 .... pled guilty to a charge of aggravated assault
through a plea bargaining arrangement in which a charge of attempted mur-
der was dismissed.
Le Maire admitted he went to the home of Paul Handeen . . .July 9
[1978] waited for Handeen to arrive and then fired five shots at him with a
.22 caliber rifle.
In sentencing him to Stillwater [state prison], [state district courtJudge
Sidney] Abramson told Le Maire, "But for the grace of you being a bad shot
you are here for aggravated assault, not murder."
Le Maire told Abramson he thought shooting Handeen was the only
way to bring about 'justice."
Hours before the shooting, according to court records, Le Maire and
his girlfriend learned they had been unsuccessful in getting a court to termi-
nate Handeen's visitation rights involving a child he and his ex-wife had
before their divorce. The child was in the custody of the mother.
[Judge Abramson stated that Le Maire] committed an "act that is as
vicious an act that I have ever seen."
St. Paul Pioneer Press, Oct. 20, 1978, at 20, col. 1.
186. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1347.
187. Id.
188. Id. The degree was in experimental behavioral pharmacology. Id.
189. Id. Handeen obtained his civil judgment in September 1985. Le Maire, 883
F.2d at 1375. Le Maire entered into a consent judgment and paid $3,000 of the
amount owed. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1347. He then stopped paying, and Handeen
began garnishment proceedings. Id.
190. Id. Le Maire filed bankruptcy in January 1987. While Hartley could have
filed for bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or 13, Le Maire could only file under
Chapter 13 (in order to discharge his debt to Handeen) because per section 523(a)(6)
19.90]
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Handeen objected to confirmation of the plan on the ground that the
plan was not proposed in good faith. Handeen argued that a debt
nondischargeable by virtue of section 523(a)(6) in a Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding cannot be dischargeable in a Chapter 13 proceeding, and
also that one who seeks to discharge a debt arising from criminal
conduct can never do so in good faith.19' Handeen argued that al-
lowing such a discharge would result in Chapter 13 becoming a "ha-
ven for criminal debtors" under which to discharge their related civil
debts.192 Handeen argued in the alternative that Le Maire's Chapter
13 plan should not have been confirmed because it did not meet the
statutory requirement of being proposed in good faith.193
The Eighth Circuit Appellate Panel found the issue to be as stated
above-whether the fact that this debt would be nondischargeable
under Chapter 7 rendered it nondischargeable under Chapter 13.194
Basing its holding on the history of the good faith requirement and
the Eighth Circuit's previous interpretation of good faith, the panel
found section 523(a)(6) to be no bar to the dischargeability of
Handeen's judgment against Le Maire for the debtor's vicious
assault. 195
The panel began its analysis by noting that the pertinent section of
the Code itself, section 1328(a), precluded discharge for only two
types of debts, neither of which was for a "willful and malicious in-
jury."19 6 Thus such a debt may be discharged if the debtor meets
the six requirements of Chapter 13.!97 The panel stated that the
Eighth Circuit's definition of good faith is cited in Estus and derived
from Chapter 11 of the old Bankruptcy Act: "whether or not under
the circumstances of the case there has been an abuse of the provi-
sions, purpose, or spirit of [the Chapter] in the proposal of the plan
debts for a "willful and malicious injury" cannot be discharged under Chapter 13.
Wickham, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13: Guiding Consumer Debtor Choice Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 815, 821 (1980).
191. Le Maire, 883 F.2d at 1376, 1377. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan
and Handeen appealed. The district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy
court. Handeen then appealed to the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit Appellate
Panel affirmed the district court. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1347-48. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals then granted rehearing en banc, and on March 26, 1990, reversed
the decision of the district court. The decision of the appellate panel was vacated. Id.
192. Le Maire, 883 F.2d at 1374-75.
193. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1348.
194. Le Maire, 883 F.2d at 1376. The court noted that it was undisputed that the
debt would be nondischargeable under Chapter 7, as the debtor's act clearly arose
out of a "willful and malicious injury" per section 523(a)(6). Id. Thus the case is one
of first impression in the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 1376.
195. Id. at 1377, 1379.
196. Id. at 1377. See supra note 129 for the two types of debts which cannot be
discharged under Chapter 13.
197. Id. at 1377. See supra note 171 for these 'requirements.
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.... "198 This good faith standard is to be determined by consider-
ing.and weighing the twelve factors set out by the Estus court. 199
Finding that the bankruptcy court properly considered the Estus
factors and found Le Maire's plan to be in good ,faith, the panel
could not say that the decision was clearly erroneous, and thus the
bankruptcy court's determination regarding good faith must
stand.200 The bankruptcy court also considered the fresh start pol-
icy, which the Eighth Circuit termed "the cornerstone of bankruptcy
law."201 Ultimately, in weighing the "competing equities" of the
case, the panel accepted the finding of the bankruptcy judge202 who
concluded that Le Maire was sincere in his proposed plan of repay-
ment, and was attempting to repay Handeen to the extent he was
able.203
Finally, the panel disposed of the creditor's remaining objections
to confirmation of the plan.204 The panel ratified the bankruptcy
court's findings that the debtor: 1) was applying all of his disposable
income to the plan;205 2) that his inclusion of monthly rent to his
parents of $240 per month was a legitimate expense;20 6 3) that the
198. Id. at 1378 (quoting In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1989), quoting In
re Deans, 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982), quoting the old Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 766(4) (1976) (repealed)).
199. 883 F.2d at 1378. See supra note 162 for the twelve factors. Estus was de-
cided in 1982, and in 1984 Congress clarified much of the confusion over the mean-
ing of good faith when it amended Chapter 13 by adding new section 1325(b). See
supra note 181 and accompanying text. While this Congressional action changed the
interpretation of good faith in some circuits, the Estus twelve factors test remains
good law. Le Maire, 883 F.2d at 1379.
200. Id. at 1379. The appellate court reviews findings of fact under a clearly erro-
neous standard. Id. The district court had affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.
201. Id. at 1380. Regarding the debtor's fresh start in the instant case, the appel-
late court took note of the bankruptcy court's conclusion that "Le Maire, after serv-
ing his sentence, is getting back on his feet both professionally and financially." Id.
202. The appellate court itself did not analyze Le Maire's good faith by applying
the twelve Estus factors. Instead it relied upon and adopted the bankruptcy court's
conclusions. Id. at 1379-80.
203. Id. at 1380. The bankruptcy judge stated, "I feel that he [the debtor] has
made a whole hearted attempt to pay Handeen as much as he is able, which turns out
to be a significant amount. Under these circumstances, I feel that his motivation is
proper and his sincerity real." Id. Under the plan as confirmed Handeen would re-
ceive 42.3 percent of the $50,362 judgment against Le Maire. Id. at 1376.
204. Id. at 1380-81.
205. Id. at 1380. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor had approximately
$424 per month in disposable income, while under his plan he proposed to pay $500
per month. Id. at 1376.
206. Id. at 1381. While Le Maire was in graduate school he paid no rent to his
parents. Id. at 1380. Beginning in January 1987, the same month he filed his Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy petition, Le Maire's parents required that he pay rent or leave. Id.
at 1380. Le Maire's original plan listed monthly rent of $400, which his parents re-
duced to $240 "to enable him to make more substantial payments on his bankruptcy
1990]
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debtor's income from his university fellowship qualified as Chapter
13 "regular income";2o 7 and 4) that the debtor's debt to his parents
of $3,600 for legal fees was not barred by either the six-year statute
of limitations or the statute of frauds.208 The decisions of the bank-
ruptcy and district courts confirming the plan were thereby
upheld.20 9
The decision that the debtor's Chapter 13 plan was proposed in
good faith should have been found clearly erroneous by the panel.
Application of the Estus factors to the facts of the Le Maire case argue
for this conclusion. Six of the factors appear salient here.210 Two of
these factors weigh in favor of the debtor. Under the plan, Handeen
would receive 42.3% of the judgment owed him, which could be con-
sidered to be substantial repayment.2 t1 Second, the duration of the
plan as confirmed was for the statutory maximum of sixty months.212
Four of these factors weigh in favor of the creditor. Regarding Le
Maire's ability to earn and likely future increases in income, when
Handeen won the civil judgment Le Maire held a Ph.D. degree, and
at the time of the appellate court decision he was offered a position
with an additional $2,500 in salary.213 His earning power from his
advanced degree and the attendant raises one might expect from
such a position do not appear to have been properly considered by
plan." Id. The bankruptcy court found no collusion regarding this matter. Id. at
1381.
207. Id. at 1381. One of the requirements to have a Chapter 13 plan confirmed is
that the debtor's income be "sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual
to make payments under a plan .... " 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1988). The bankruptcy
court found that Le Maire qualified, as for the previous two years he had averaged
$16,000 from his position as a university fellow, and that "he has been offered a post-
fellowship research position with a University scientist at a salary of $18,500." 883
F.2d at 1381.
208. Id. The bankruptcy court found that debtor Le Maire had waived the six-year
statute of limitations, that the statute had not yet begun to run (since the parents had
never demanded payment), and that the Statute of Frauds did not apply since the
relevant oral contracts could be performed within one year. Id.
209. Id.
210. Of the twelve Estus factors, five appear minor or less important in this case.
See supra note 162 for factors (1), (5), (6), (8), (9), and (11). Estus factor (1) is "the
amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the debior's surplus." This
factor has apparently been rendered moot by Congress' 1984 passage of the "ability-
to-pay" provision of § 1325(b)(1), which requires that all the debtor's projected dis-
posable income be applied to make payments under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)
(1988). Thus there can no longer be a debtor surplus.
211. Percentage of repayment is the first factor enunciated in Estus, see supra note
162 (it is not numbered as a factor by the court). See supra note 203 regarding Le
Maire's repayment. While substantial repayment is no longer required, 5 COLLIER,
see supra note 26, at § 1325.04[3] at 1325-17, many courts still consider it as one
factor to be weighed.
212. 883 F.2d at 1376.
213. Id. at 1381.
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A second factor in Handeen's favor was that Le Maire's statement
of debts and expenses presented many questions of accuracy, and
appear to have been calculated to mislead the court.215 The bank-
ruptcy court disallowed two debts Le Maire contended were owed
his parents, finding one to be a gift and the other to be mere use of
property owned by his parents, not a purchase from, and debt to
them. 2 16 Le Maire, who lived at his parents' residence, originally
listed monthly rent of $400 as an expense owed to his parents.
21 7
He had lived at his parents' residence for several years and had never
before paid rent. Even though Le Maire first paid his parents rent
the same month in which he filed bankruptcy, 218 the bankruptcy
court found no collusion between Le Maire and his creditors-par-
ents. 219 Finally, the bankruptcy court upheld as a loan the $3,600
which Le Maire's parents had paid for his legal fees, but for which
they had never requested payment.2 20 From this listing it appears
that the debtor, in order to minimize his disposable income and to
mislead the court, claimed every debt which the court might plausi-
bly accept as an expense.
The third factor in Handeen's favor was that in making a good
faith determination, Le Maire's debt to Handeen (as a "willful and
malicious injury" under section 523(a)(6)) would not have been dis-
chargeable had Le Maire been proceeding in bankruptcy under
Chapter 7.221 Lastly, and most importantly, the evidence indicates
214. The bankruptcy court found Le Maire's annual net income to be $14,222.72
($1,185.24 times 12). Id. at 1376. This appears to be based upon the $18,500 figure
rather than the $16,000 figure. However, given Le Maire's relatively strong earning
power by virtue of an advanced degree in a technical field (experimental behavioral
pharmacology) and the likelihood of rapid salary increases, it should be concluded
that a payment plan based only on Le Maire's present earnings could greatly under-
value his future disposable income.
215. See supra note 162 for Estus factor (4).
216. 883 F.2d at 1375. It appears to be no great coincidence that Le Maire's par-
ents allowed him to live at home rent-free untilJanuary 1987, when he was requested
to pay $400 per month-the same month in which he filed bankruptcy. While Le
Maire contended he owed a debt to his parents of $3,050 for living and education
expenses for the period 1971 to 1981, the court held this to be a gift by the parents.
Id. While Le Maire also claimed that he owed his parents $900 for the purchase of a
car, the court found that the parents held title to the car and were merely allowing Le
Maire to use it. Id.




221. See, e.g., In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 1988) (bankruptcy court
erred in failing to consider the circumstances in which debt arose and fact of nondis-
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not that Le Maire was sincerely motivated to repay his debt to
Handeen, but rather that he wanted to pay the bare minimum to
Handeen to receive discharge of the debt.222
Le Maire's original Chapter 13 plan proposed paying $175 per
month for thirty-six months.22s He later submitted a modified plan
proposing $265 per month for thirty-six months, a 14% dividend to
his creditors. 22 4 The bankruptcy court rejected this plan, expressing
"concern" over its deficiency.225 Le Maire responded with the pres-
ent plan of $500 per month for sixty months, a 42% dividend.22 6
This indicates that, by any measure, Le Maire did not act with the
required good faith in the proposal of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy
plan.227 Since the plan was not proposed in good faith, which is a
violation of the spirit of the Code, it should not have been
confirmed.
While the Le Maire panel properly considered that "the principle
of fresh start ... is the cornerstone of bankruptcy law,"2 2 8 counter-
vailing concerns must also be heard. Dissenting in Le Maire, Judge
Gibson gave voice to those concerns:
The court today is swayed by the bankruptcy court's concern with
the debtor having to live the rest of his life with a significant judg-
ment that would be inimical to a fresh start .... This leaves com-
pletely out of the equation the fact that the intentionally injured
creditor has to live the rest of his life with the injuries inflicted and
with the partial amount paid on the judgment as his only balm.
2 29
222. See supra note 162 for factor (10).
223. Le Maire, 883 F.2d at 1375.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1375-76. The bankruptcy court "concluded that Le Maire was not ap-
plying all of his disposable income to the plan and expressed concern about Le
Maire's failure to propose a plan for the maximum statutory period of sixty months."
Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988).
226. 883 F.2d at 1376.
227. On this basis Le Maire should have been found to have failed the Estus
twelve-factor good faith test. The more generalized good faith test is whether "there
has been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of [the Chapter] in the propo-
sal of the plan .... " Id. at 1378. Le Maire's first two proposals are not consonant
with the purpose or spirit of Chapter 13.
228. 883 F.2d at 1380.
229. Id. at 1382 (Gibson,J. dissenting). This is the facfor which has been omitted
from the Bankruptcy Code equation-the involuntary creditor who is an intentionally
physically injured tort victim. Two of these factors in particular distinguish the Hartley
and Le Maire situations from the typical contract-based debt situation. First, these
two creditors are involuntary creditors; they never entered into a contractual agree-
ment with the debtor based upon an assessment of the debtors' creditworthiness.
Second, they suffered serious physical injuries, not mere pecuniary harm, as a result
of the debtors' acts.
(Vol. 16
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IX. THE EN BANC DECISION
These concerns became the rationale of the majority in the en
banc decision.230 The entire Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Le Maire's plan should not have been confirmed, contrary to the
holdings of the bankruptcy court, the district court, and the Eighth
Circuit panel. 23 ' The court entertained two arguments by Handeen.
First Handeen asserted that debts arising out of criminal acts cannot
be discharged in bankruptcy. Second, Handeen argued that Le
Maire did not propose his Chapter 13 plan in good faith.232 The
court rejected the former argument, but held in favor of Handeen on
the latter.2 33
The court focused its analysis on two of the Estus factors tradition-
ally used to determine good faith: 1) whether the debt would be non-
dischargeable in Chapter 7; and 2) what was the debtor's motivation
in seeking Chapter 13 relief.234 The court stated that the issue of
nondischargeability under Chapter 7 "is closely linked to the
debtor's motivation and sincerity."235 It therefore proceeded to ana-
lyze good faith based upon Le Maire's motivation and sincerity in
filing bankruptcy. 2 36 The court found that the bankruptcy court had
failed to give proper weight to "the strong public policy factors, in-
herent in the Bankruptcy Code," which militate against discharge of
this particular debt.237 The court said the bankruptcy court gave
"undue emphasis" to the lack of a statutory exception from dis-
charge for debts resulting from willful and malicious injury.238 It
then analyzed four primary facts which manifested a lack of good
faith and an attempt to unfairly manipulate the Bankruptcy Code.239
Two of the matters which initially concerned the court were pre-
filing actions by Le Maire.240 The first was that Le Maire intended to,
230. In the panel decision, decided by a two-to-one vote, Judge Magill wrote for
the majority, and Judge Gibson wrote the dissent. Le Maire, 883 F.2d at 1374, 1382.
In the en banc decision their positions were reversed. Judge Gibson wrote the major-
ity opinion and Judge Magill wrote the well-reasoned dissent. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at
1347, 1353.
231. Id. at 1347-48.
232. Id. at 1348.
233. Id. at. 1348, 1353.
234. Id. at 1350.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1351.
238. Id.
239. Id. The court notes that lack of good faith is evidenced by a plan which "con-
stitutes an abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter 13." Id. The Eighth
Circuit chastised the bankruptcy court for altogether failing to address the issue of
whether Le Maire tried unfairly to manipulate the Code. Id. at 1351 n.7.
240. Id. at 1351. The court erroneously states that pre-filing conduct may be con-
sidered in the good faith determination. Id. at 1352. In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 1325
1990]
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and nearly succeeded in, killing Handeen.241 Second, Le Maire
sought to discharge the ensuing debt in bankruptcy after Handeen
had taken legal action to collect it.242 The-court was also "troubled"
by the validity of the debts which Le Maire claimed to owe his par-
ents. The court, however, did not base its decision on this
ground. 243 Finally, the court considered that Le Maire failed to in-
clude a contingent $30,000 to $50,000 debt in his Chapter 13
plan.244 These four facts supplied the court with a basis for its
,holding.
The court held that Le Maire lacked the requisite good faith to be
entitled to confirmation. However, the court limited its holding by
cautioning that its decision "should not be read as a broad declara-
tion extending beyond the facts before us.- 24 5 In coming to this
conclusion, the court first applied what it considered to be the re-
spective strengths of the public policies promoted by not allowing
discharge of the section 523(a) debts.246 The court concluded that
"there is a particularly strong policy prohibiting the discharge of a
debt resulting from willful and malicious injury following an at-
tempted murder."247 The court recognized that Congress purpose-
fully expanded the scope of the discharge under Chapter 13 to
encourage more debtors to repay their debts.248 But the court be-
(1988) sets out the requirements for court confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. None
of these requirements allow the court to take into consideration the pre-filing con-
duct or actions of the debtor, as Chapter 13 is intended to be highly remedial in
nature.
241. Id. at 1351.
242. Id.
243. Id. at n.6. Le Maire signed a $12,722 promissory note to his parents one day
before filing his bankruptcy petition, and he never made any payments to them on
the existing debt although he had income. This fact and the other suspicious circum-
stances surrounding the debts owed to his parents should have been a "red flag" to
the court that the debtor was manipulating creditor repayment in bad faith. Id.
244. Id. at 1351. The debt owed to the U.S. Public Health Service would be for-
given contingent upon Le Maire's continuation of his employment in a post-fellow-
ship research position at the University of Minnesota. Id. at 1358-59 (Magill, J.
dissenting). Le Maire, however, intended to continue his employment. Id. at 1359.
245. Id. at 1353. The Eighth Circuit does not clarify whether only debts arising
out of an attempted murder will be held nondischargeable under Chapter 13, or
whether some unspecified lesser tortious conduct may suffice for finding a lack of
good faith on the part of the debtor.
246. Id. at 1352. The Eighth Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court was correct
in stating that the section 523(a)(6) exceptions to discharge do not "expressly apply to
a Chapter 13 petition." Id. (emphasis added). The bankruptcy court's error was in
not examining what public policies were served by barring discharge of section 523(a)
debts. Id.
247. Id. at 1353.
248. Id. (citing In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 313 (8th Cir. 1982)). The court quoted
a U.S. House of Representatives Report which stated that the broader discharge al-
lowed under Chapter 13 "should furnish a greater incentive for the debtor' to per-
[Vol. 16
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lieved that the same public policies that justified an exception to the
nondischargeability of a willful and malicious injury under Chapter 7
were also implicated in "this particular Chapter 13 case."
24 9
X. ANALYSIS OF THE EN BANC DECISION
The court's refusal to confirm Le Maire's Chapter 13 plan was a
just result. Given the debtor's conduct in arguably manipulating
creditor repayment, Le Maire evidenced a lack of good faith in the
proposal of his plan.250 Yet, although the court arrived at an equita-
ble result, it did so by way of an inherently flawed analysis.
The court begins by correctly rejecting Handeen's contention that
as a matter of law a civil judgment cannot be discharged in bank-
ruptcy if it arose from a criminal act. 2 5 1 Section 1328(a) excepts
from discharge only two kinds of debts; the willful and malicious in-
jury exception is not one of them.25 2 The court also correctly noted
that Congress purposefully broadened the Chapter 13 discharge
provision significantly beyond that allowed in Chapter 7. The intent
was to induce more consumer debtors to repay creditors to the ex-
tent possible from their post-petition disposable income.253 The
court's conclusion that section 523(a)(6) does not apply to Chapter
13 cases was proper.
254
The court reduced to a footnote its consideration of whether the
circumstances of Le Maire's alleged debts to his parents evidenced a
lack of good faith.255 While the court was "troubled" by a number
of the irregularities, it decided not to closely review the bankruptcy
court's finding of good faith with regard to the debts.256 The court's
refusal to scrutinize these debts, however, was improper for two rea-
sons. First, the facts before the court presented ample opportunity
for finding that the debtor was attempting to mislead the bankruptcy
form under the [Chapter 13] plan." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 98, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 129, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6090.
249. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1353 (emphasis added).
250. Id. at 1351 n.6. Two facts support the conclusion that Le Maire did not pro-
pose his plan in good faith. First, the totality of the circumstances surrounding his
alleged debts to his parents make it unlikely that these were legitimate debts. The
court was justifiably "troubled" about this. Second, Le Maire's second plan was re-
jected by the bankruptcy court for failing to apply all disposible income to the plan,
which evidences a lack of good faith.
251. Id. at 1348.
252. See id. at n.2.
253. LeMaire, 898 F.2d at 1353. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 122,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6082-84.
254. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1348. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988).
255. Id. at 1351 n.6.
256. Id. The court found other grounds upon which to find the lower court's
holding clearly erroneous. Id.
1990]
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court and manipulate the Bankruptcy Code.257 Second, under ex-
isting precedent, the fact of debtor misconduct in the proposal of his
plan is the only ground upon which a finding of lack of good faith
can be based under Chapter 13.258
While the court was especially conservative in refusing to analyze
Le Maire's debts to his parents, it over compensated in its considera-
tion of his pre-petition conduct. Both the literal language and the
public policy supporting Chapter 13 mandate the consideration of a
debtor's conduct only from the point of filing bankruptcy.2 59 The
dissent recognizes this analysis and emphasizes that section
1325(a)(3) "requires that the plan be 'proposed in good faith'..., not
that the debt was incurred in good faith."260 Yet the court improp-
erly takes into consideration both the fact that Le Maire committed a
heinous willful and malicious injury and that he filed bankruptcy only
when Handeen tried to collect his judgment.261
Most significant was the court's improper consideration of "public
policy" as the major ground for its holding that Le Maire's plan
should not have been confirmed.262 Handeen contended that a civil
liability resulting from a criminal act could never be discharged in
bankruptcy, and the court correctly rejected this contention. 263 By
257. The Eighth Circuit failed to employ its own good faith test. See id. at 1349
for the Estus good faith test.
258. The court's own good faith definition in the opinion bears this out. Good
faith has been limited to the accuracy of listed debts and expenses, fraudulent mis-
representation to the bankruptcy court, and unfair manipulation of the Code. Id. at
1349.
259. Bankruptcy is intended to be highly remedial, and Chapter 13 is the most
remedial portion of the Code as it contains the broadest discharge provision. All of
the requirements of section 1325 are concerned with present and future conduct, not
past conduct. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988). See also Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1358 n.16.
(Magill, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 1357. (Magill, J. dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
261. Id. at 1351. The dissent's point is well taken and neither factor may be con-
sidered under Chapter 13. Moreover, the latter factor is present in many bankruptcy
filings and is the obvious reason most debtors seek bankruptcy relief. The debtor, if
acting honestly, ought not to file bankruptcy until payment efforts have failed.
262. Id. at 1353. "[W]e believe that there is a particularly strong public policy.
prohibiting the discharge of a debt resulting from a willful and malicious injury fol-
lowing an attempted murder." Id.
263. Id. at 1348. The court's reasoning was sound in rejecting Handeen's
contention:
Handeen's reliance upon section 523(a)(6) is unavailing, however, because
Le Maire filed his petition under Chapter 13, which does not include section
523(a)(6) in its list of nondischargeable debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)
(1988). Although section 523(a)(6) does by its express statutory terms apply
to a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, its applicability does not ex-
tend to a filing under Chapter 13. Therefore, a debt which falls within the
scope of section 523(a)(6), such as the debt owed to Handeen, which may
not be discharged under Chapter 7, may nevertheless be discharged if the
debtor meets the requirements of Chapter 13.
(Vol. 16
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this very same reasoning, the court should have concluded that the
public policy rationale behind excepting a section 523(a)(6) debt
from discharge under Chapter 7 does not apply to Chapter 13.264 In
invalidating Le Maire's plan by relying upon the public policy of sec-
tion 523(a)(6), the court implicitly adopts the very contention that it
claimed to reject-that debts arising out of criminal acts cannot be
discharged in bankruptcy. The court thus appears to have written
into Chapter 13 an exception to discharge for section 523(a)(6) will-
ful and malicious injury to the creditor.
The decision, however, may be limited to its egregious facts.265 As
the dissent points out, the majority is preoccupied with the vicious-
ness of the assault on Handeen.2 66 If Le Maire had not planned the
crime, waited for and stalked his victim, and attempted to murder
him, would the court still have found Le Maire's motive, sincerity,
and-good faith lacking? Has the court fully adopted Handeen's posi-
tion that criminal acts cannot be discharged, or is this third excep-
tion limited to attempted murder? Given that James Hartley
intended to commit a civil assault against Rickey Jones, would the
result in that case change if it were decided after Le Maire?
CONCLUSION
The deficiency in the analysis of Le Maire by the panel was its find-
ing that the district court's holding was not clearly erroneous in con-
cluding that Le Maire's Chapter 13 plan was proposed in good
faith.267 If the good faith requirement is to be given effect, as it
must, the courts must deny confirmation of plans when those plans
do not meet the good faith standard as it has been defined by the
courts. A consideration of Le Maire's questionable debts to his par-
ents and prior submission of an inadequate plan required a contrary
conclusion. 2 68
Id. (footnotes omitted).
264. The court criticized the bankruptcy court for not considering public policy
factors in Le Maire's attempt to discharge his debt under Chapter 13:
We are convinced that the court's analysis here fails to properly consider the
strong public policy factors, inherent in the Bankruptcy Code, which are
implicated in discharging this debt and gives undue emphasis to the fact that
the statutory terms governing Chapter 13 petitions do not expressly make a
debt resulting from a willful and malicious injury nondischargeable.
Id. at 1351. The analysis is identical to that cited above in note 263; only the ultimate
conclusion is changed.
265. Id. at 1353. "Our decision should not be read as a broad declaration ex-
tending beyond the facts before us." Id.
266. Le Maire, 898 F.2d at 1356-57 (Magill, J., dissenting).
267. The court was reviewing the opinion of the district court under a clearly erro-
neous standard. In re Le Maire, 883 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989).
268. A review of the facts of Le Maire can lead to but one conclusion-that Le
Maire was attempting to mislead the court and shortchange Handeen by seeking
1990]
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That conclusion was reached by the court en banc, but by way of
faulty reasoning. The court's focus on the pre-filing circumstances
out of which the debt arose is contrary to both the literal language
and purpose of Chapter 13's broad discharge. The court recognized
both of these facts, yet still considered the nature of the assault.269
The court then invoked the public policy behind Chapter 7 to deny
LeMaire confirmation under Chapter 13.270 The Eighth Circuit is
apparently re-writing the Code to conform with its reading of public
policy.271
This judicially-promulgated exception to discharge will rarely af-
fect Chapter 13 debtors and creditors. It appears constrained to in-
juries arising out of acts of attempted murder.2 72 Had the
bankruptcy and district courts considered the Hartley case under the
Le Maire panel standard, would the debt have been clearly nondis-
chargeable under Chapter 7? Or would it still have been a close
case?
court confirmation of a plan with as low a repayment dividend as he could get away
with.
The general Eighth Circuit good faith standard is that the plan must not consti-
tute "an abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter 13." In.re Estus, 695
F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1982) (one of the twelve Estus factors to determine good faith
is the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief). See id. at
317. Le Maire clearly ran afoul of the Estus motivation and sincerity standard when
his second proposed plan was rejected by the bankruptcy court for failure to apply all
disposable income to the plan, and failure to propose a plan for the maximum statu-
tory period of 60 months. When a debtor proposes a plan which is deficient, and the
deficiency is motivated by a desire on the part of the debtor to retain for himself
income which the debtor knows should go to the creditor under the plan, a patent
lack of good faith exists. A bankruptcy court, being a court of equity, should not
allow a debtor who has acted in bad faith to propose another plan and have the court
confirm it.
269. The section 1325 requirements do not concern pre-filing conduct. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325 (1988). The court noted that " 'a Chapter 13 plan may be confirmed despite
even the most egregious pre-filing conduct where other factors suggest that the plan
nevertheless represents a good faith effort by the debtor to satisfy his creditors'
claims.'" Ie Maire, 898 F.2d at 1352 (quoting Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149,
153 (4th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis'in original). The court also explicitly recognized that
"Congress intentionally expanded the scope of the debtor's discharge in Chapter 13"
to induce more debtors to repay their debts. Id. at 1353.
270. "[W~e believe that the public policies promoted by not discharging a debt
resulting from willful or malicious injury in any Chapter 7 case are also implicated in
this particular Chapter 13 case .... " Id.
271. The desire to deny confirmation of Le Maire's plan in order that Handeen
may receive the full $50,362.50 judgment due him is a proper end. But the present
Code denies courts the means to deny confirmation of such Chapter 13 plans. As the
closing line of the dissenting opinion states, "the remedy lies with Congress, not the
judiciary." Id. at 1361. Unfortunately, Congress has not seen fit to remedy the situa-
tion in the more than 10 years that Chapter 13 has been in effect.
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The Le Maire decision was reached by applying Chapter 7 public
policy to Chapter 13. It would logically follow that the Chapter 7
*nondischargeability standard has not at all been affected by Le Maire.
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit will continue to require a high stan-
dard of malice by the debtor in order to find a debt nondischarge-
able under Chapter 7; only malice approaching attempted murder
will remove a Chapter 13 debt from the realm of dischargeability.
The end result is that few if any creditors who challenge debtor
bankruptcy plans on section 523(a)(6) grounds will see a change in
the ultimate disposition of those plans by the court.
As a matter of public policy it may be desirable to deny to
criminals a benefit which exists primarily for honest but unfortunate
debtors- discharge in bankruptcy.273 Also, creditors injured by
criminal conduct are especially deserving of the debt owed them. On
the other hand, economic reality militates in favor of retaining even
for criminal debtors the broad dischargeability offered by Chapter
13. Ultimately the choice involves a trade-off among competing poli-
cies, with the creditor appearing the more deserving by virtue of the
status as an innocent victim.
Rickey Jones and Paul Handeen were both assaulted by bank-
ruptcy debtors and suffered severe physical injuries. Whether Con-
gress intended to add insult to assault by allowing the discharge of
those debts is a question with which the courts will struggle until
Congress provides a definitive answer.
Jack R. Fugina
273. Handeen argued that the Eighth Circuit court should adopt a bright line rule
automatically precluding from dischargeability debts arising out of criminal conduct.
In re Le Maire, 883 F.2d 1373, 1373-74 (8th Cir. 1989). He claimed that if discharge
were allowed Chapter 13 would become a "haven for criminal debtors." Id. at 1374.
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